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Lewis v. McAdam: A Narrow Interpretation of 
Standing Fulfills the Purpose of Section 16(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Section 
16(b)")1 was designed to curb insider trading leading to "sure thing"2 
profits at the expense of individual stockholders and "to protect the 
securities markets from untoward infiuences."3 A series of cases over 
the years has explored various aspects of Section 16(b) such as: what 
is a purchase and sale;' who is an issuer;1I who are beneficial owners;6 
and limits of the statute's purposes.7 However, one aspect of Section 
16(b) not fully elucidated by case law is the question of standing. In 
deciding who has standing when an issuer corporation is extinguished 
I Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). 
2 Profits made by corporate insiders as a result of their access to inside information. "Sure 
thing" profits were considered to be a perk of office until the enactment of the Exchange Act in 
1934. See Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to 
"Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69 (1966). 
3 Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REV. 133, 144 (1939). 
• Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 
(1970) (in determining whether a transaction is a purchase or a sale under Section 16(b), it is 
necessary to consider whether there is a potential for speculative abuse because of the pur-
chaser's or seller's access to inside information). 
, Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indust., Inc., 607 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1979) (the issuer is the 
person who issues the security involved in the short-swing transaction). 
• Rothenberg v. United Brands Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 96,045, at 91,690 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (beneficial ownership of a security of an issuer may be lost as a result of a merger of the 
issuer and another corporation). 
7 See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) (the 
purpose of section 16(b) is to protect the public by preventing insiders from purchasing or 
selling stock on the basis of information that may have been obtained through the insider's 
relationship to the corporation); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) 
(Section 16(b) does not impose liability on an insider for profit realized on the sale of stock sold 
more than six months after purchase, although the sale was planned within six months of 
purchase); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 
(1965) (the abuses inherent in insider trading can best be controlled through a flat rule elimi-
nating profits from a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse is intolerably great); 
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (Con-
gress intended 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) to prevent conflict between the fiduciary officer, director or 
stockholder's selfish interest and the performance of his duty by removing all profits from the 
transactions covered). 
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in a merger, Lewis u. McAdam,s a 1985 Ninth Circuit case, inter-
preted standing narrowly, limiting standing to the issuer or holders of 
securities of the issuer. This note examines how the Lewis decision, 
in contrast to Blau u. Oppenheim,9 reached its result, and how that 
result fulfills the purpose of Section 16(b). 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Section 16(b) and Its Purposes 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") was passed 
in response to stock market abuses during the Coolidge and Hoover 
administrations that led to the infamous Wall Street crash of 1929.10 
The Exchange Act was drafted by the House Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee, which labored for nine weeks before submit-
ting it for a house vote. 11 The bill underwent many changes in both 
the House and Senate before it was finally approved. 12 Section 16(b) 
specifically addresses the problem of corporate insiders who abuse 
8 762 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1985). 
• 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In allowing a shareholder of a parent company standing 
to sue, the Blau court adopted a much broader interpretation of Section 16(b) than did the 
Lewis court. The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 16(b) in only three decisions: Kern 
County Land Co., 411 U.S. at.591-96; Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 422-27; Blau v. Lehman, 
368 U.S. 403, 409-11 (1962). Lower court cases are therefore quite significant in interpreting the 
statute. 
10 78 CONGo REc. 10,995 (1934). The Exchange Act includes various other regulatory mea-
sures, some of which may come under particular scrutiny in light of the insider trading scandal 
that broke in the fall of 1986 involving Ivan Boesky, a Wall Street arbitrageur. 
11 Id. 
12 Id: Section 16(b) provides: 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been 
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and 
purchase, or any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) 
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good 
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased 
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to 
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent 
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name 
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within 
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but 
no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was 
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such 
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the 
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the 
purpose of this subsection. 
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
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their positions of trust to enrich themselves at shareholders' ex-
pense.13 The framers of Section 16(b) sought to create a damage ac-
tion that outsiders could bring against corporate traders who profited 
through inside information not available to the general investing 
public. 14 To "protect the interests of the public against the predatory 
operation of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corpora-
tions by preventing them from speculating in the stock of corpora-
tions to which they owe a fiduciary duty,"ll! the issuer of securities or 
a holder of securities of the issuer may bring suit on transactions in-
volving the abuse of inside information.16 Actual abuse of inside in-
formation need not be proven.17 
B. Putting Lewis and Blau in Context 
Early Section 16(b) cases were routinely decided under an "objec-
tive"18 approach in which courts assumed that insiders had access to 
inside information and that they must have abused this information 
whenever there was a profitable short-swingl9 transaction.20 As an an-
tidote to this harsh approach, courts developed a "pragmatic"21 way 
of interpreting Section 16(b) issues, particularly in response to mod-
ern types of corporate reclassifications and reorganizations not antici-
pated in 1934.22 The pragmatic approach focuses on the policy be-
hind the statute's terms.23 One danger inherent in the pragmatic 
approach to Section 16(b) interpretation is to overlook the statute's 
literal command in the attempt to justify a particular policy reading. 
13 Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 602-03. Section 16(b) is not the only means of recovering 
profits improperly gained by outsiders. Section 10(b) (15 U.S.C. § 78 j(b) Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934) and SEC Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder (extending the common law concept 
of fraud to cover failure to disclose material information that might have affected a transaction) 
are anti-fraud provisions. 
14 Hearings of S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 before the Senate Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) . 
.. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934). 
18 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
17 See, e.g., Kern County Land Co., 411 U.S. at 599; Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 425; Blau 
v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Smolowe, 136 
F.2d at 235-36, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). 
18 Note, Involuntariness and Other Contemporary Problems Under Section 16(b) of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 680-85 (1976). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b); see also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 
242-44 (1976); Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 422-25; Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d 
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954). 
20 See Note, supra note 18, at 684. 
21 Id. 
22 Lang and Katz, Section 16(b) and 'Extraordinary' Transactions: Corporate Reorganiza-
tions and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 705, 707 (1974). 
23 See Note, supra note 18, at 681. 
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The Blau court fell into this trap; the Lewis court did not. 
The events giving rise to Lewis v. McAdam began on December 31, 
1981, when Sears, Roebuck and Company acquired Coldwell Banker 
through Sears' wholly owned subsidiary, Sears Development Corpora-
tion ("SDC"). SDC gave Coldwell shareholders the option to ex-
change their Coldwell stock for cash, for shares of Sears, or for any 
combination of cash and shares. William McAdam, a director of 
Coldwell who owned 43,560 Coldwell shares, tendered 30,130 shares 
for cash and exchanged 13,430 shares for Sears stock. McAdam had 
acquired 3,300 of his 30,130 shares of Coldwell during a merger of 
Coldwell with First Newport on September 15, 1981. The subsequent 
sale of the 3,300 shares, during the Coldwell-SDC merger, yielded 
McAdam a profit of $62,287.24 
Harry Lewis, a shareholder of Sears who did not own stock in SDC 
or Coldwell, demanded that Sears institute a Section 16(b) action to 
recover the short swing profits McAdam made by acquiring and sell-
ing Coldwell shares within a six month period. Sears refused on the 
ground that "it would be unseemly and contrary to Sears' best inter-
ests to seek recovery of an amount SDC had voluntarily offered to 
pay in connection with an acquisition initiated by Sears. "25 Conse-
quently, Lewis brought suit against Sears, SDC and McAdam, alleg-
ing that McAdam violated Section 16(b)'s prohibition against use of 
inside information in the purchase or sale of securities in less than six 
months. 26 
Sears, SDC, and McAdam moved for summary judgment, contend-
ing that Lewis lacked standing and that McAdam's actions did not 
constitute a "purchase and sale" under Section 16(b).27 The district 
court granted summary judgment without reaching the merits.28 
Section 16(b) provides in part: 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which 
may have been obtained by . . . an insider . . . any profit realized 
by him ... within any period of less than six months ... shall in-
•• Lewis, 762 F.2d at 801-02 . 
•• [d. at 802 . 
•• [d. 
'7 For Section 16(b) to apply, the statute requires a "purchase and sale" or a "sale and 
purchase" of an equity security within a six month period. See supra n.12. See Newmark, 423 
F.2d at 344-45 on what is a purchase and sale. Since the court concluded that Lewis did not 
have standing, the Lewis court did not address the issue of whether McAdam's conversion of 
stock under the terms of the merger agreement constituted a Section 16(b) purchase and sale. 
Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804. 
'8 [d. at 802. The Ninth Circuit case is an unreported appeal from the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of Cal. under J. Pamela Ann Rymer. 
p 
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me to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . . Suit to recover such 
profit may be instituted at law or in equity by the issuer or by the 
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the 
issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit .... 29 
359 
The statute defines the group who can bring suit to be the issuer or 
any holders of securities of the issuer.3o In Lewis, the court decided 
that those who could bring actions were SDC, Coldwell Banker, or 
any shareholder of Coldwell. Although Lewis was not a holder of any 
of Coldwell's securities, he claimed that he had standing to bring a 
Section 16(b) suit. 31 He reasoned that the purpose of the Exchange 
Act was to prevent the abuse of insider trading, and therefore, a 
broad interpretation of the statute was warranted where such abuse 
would otherwise go uncorrected.32 Lewis pointed out that it is the 
public stockholders who are most likely to sue for protection from 
insider trading. This is partially a result of corporations' reluctance 
to sue their own directors.33 He further argued that since Sears had 
refused to sue,34 granting standing to Sears' shareholders was the 
only way to see that McAdam's alleged short swing profits inured to 
the corporation. 311 
Lewis based his argument on the Second Circuit decision of Blau u. 
Oppenheim.36 In Blau, the defendant was a director of Hansen-Van 
Winkle Munning Company ("Van Winkle"). He sold 3,154 shares and 
purchased 6,000 shares of Van Winkle stock within a two month pe-
riod, deriving short swing profits as defined under Section 16(b). One 
year later, in September 1964, Van Winkle was merged into M&T 
Chemical, Inc. ("M&T"), a wholly owned subsidiary of American Can 
Co. ("American"). Van Winkle sold and transferred its assets and 
choses in action to M&T in return for American shares that Van 
Winkle distributed to its American shareholders just prior to the 
merger and to its extinguishment as a separate corporation.37 Plain-
tiff Blau, like Lewis, did not own any shares of the merging company, 
Van Winkle. Blau had first purchased American shares in 1965, after 
the Van Winkle-M&T merger. Blau demanded that American or 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). 
30 Id. See also Portnoy, 607 F.2d at 767-68. 
31 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 802. 
32 Id. at 803. 
33 Id. at 803, relying on Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463, 467 (9th Cir. 1953) . 
.. Lewis, 762 F.2d at 802. On the question of whether or not Sears had standing, see infra 
note 52 and accompanying text. 
3. Id. at 803. 
3. Blau, 250 F. Supp. at 88l. 
37 I d. at 883. 
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M&T bring suit against Oppenheim. When they refused, he filed suit 
himself. The court granted standing to Blau, stating that since Sec-
tion 16(b) would allow recovery to those shareholders of Van Winkle 
at the time of Oppenheim's transaction and to those who acquired 
shares after the transaction but before Van Winkle's dissolution, 
then one who acquired shares only in the surviving corporation sub-
sequent to the disputed transactions should also be able to bring 
suit.3s 
Despite the outcome in Blau, the Ninth Circuit in Lewis granted 
McAdam, Sears, and SDC summary judgment, holding that Lewis 
did not have standing to initiate a Section 16(b) action.39 Section 
16(b) limits standing to an issuer or one who owns securities of the 
issuer.4o The Blau court acknowledged at the outset that under a "lit-
eral" reading of Section 16(b) Blau never held any securities of the 
issuer.41 To grant standing, however, the court in Blau stretched the 
literal definition that limits standing to the merged corporation's suc-
cessor by formulating the issue as whether or not, when a corporation 
merges with a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent corporation, a se-
curity holder of the surviving corporation or of its parent may bring 
an action under Section 16(b).42 Since Blau owned no securities is-
sued by the successor to the merged corporation, but only securities 
of the parent of the surviving corporation, under the established defi-
nition he would not have standing. By conferring standing on Blau, 
the court distorted both the statute's definition and its intent. By 
allowing security holders of the parent corporation of a surviving cor-
poration to bring suit, the Blau court created a whole new category of 
litigants expressly excluded by the statute. 
As the Lewis court points out, the Blau court completely over-
looked the fact that "[t]he starting point for interpreting any statute 
is the plain meaning of the language used by Congress .... [T]hat 
language, if clear and unambiguous, will ... be regarded as conclu-
sive .... "43 In fact, in subsequent Second Circuit cases, the Blau 
decision has not been followed.44 
38 [d. at 887. 
3. Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804 . 
• 0 See supra note 29. 
" Blau, 250 F. Supp. at 884 . 
•• [d . 
.. Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804 . 
•• [d. at 803. See also American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1062 (2d Cir. 
1974); Newmark, 425 F.2d 348, 352 n.2. 
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III. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE Lewis AND Blau POSITIONS 
Blau argued that since the successor corporation had no sharehold-
ers, the shareholders of the parent corporation should succeed to the 
right to file suit; otherwise, the right would be lost.411 Similarly, Lewis 
argued that since SDC, which became the issuer after Coldwell 
merged with SDC, had no security holders itself because it was 
wholly owned by Sears, its parent, Sears and its shareholders should 
be considered the issuer, and security holders of the issuer (i.e., se-
curity holders of Sears such as Lewis) should be able to bring suit 
against McAdam.46 
The Lewis court rejected his argument for two reasons. First, the 
cause of action was not lost when Coldwell merged with SDC. Since 
the federal statute does not address the question of whether the right 
to initiate a Section 16(b) action survives a merger in which the is-
suer is extinguished, the court looked to common law and the law of 
New York, the state in which SDC was incorporated.47 New York's 
law codifies the common law rule that choses in action to enforce 
property rights, including causes of action, vest in the surviving cor-
poration.48 When Coldwell was merged into SDC, SDC took over all 
of Coldwell's assets, including the right to initiate a Section 16(b) 
suit. For purposes of bringing suit, SDC is now called the issuer. By 
being classified as the issuer in place of the extinguished corporation, 
SDC, not shareholders of Sears, is empowered to bring Section 16(b) 
suits for violations by Coldwell directors that may have occurred 
prior to the merger. 
The court's second reason for rejecting Lewis' argument was that 
there still exists a "class of persons permitted by the language of the 
statute" to bring suit.49 Lewis argued that since SDC as a wholly 
owned subsidiary had no security holders, Sears should be considered 
the issuer. If Sears were considered the issuer, then shareholders of 
Sears would, by extension, be shareholders of the issuer and would 
have standing to initiate Section 16(b) suits for alleged wrongdoing 
by directors of Coldwell. However, this argument fails because SDC 
is not a "person who issues or proposes to issue any security."lIo SDC 
•• Blau, 250 F. Supp. at 886 . 
• 6 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 803. 
47 Id. 
'8 Id. See also Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965) (pointing out that at common law a tort claim for the 
protection of property rights survives) . 
• 9 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804. 
'0 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8). 
.i· 
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is technically not the issuer. By inheriting Coldwell's choses in action, 
SDC has inherited the right to sue as issuer. This means that security 
holders of Coldwell, the original issuer, or of SDC, the issuer by ac-
tion of the merger, may initiate Section 16(b) actions. 111 
Assuming arguendo that Sears also has standing to sue as a share-
holder of SDC, the court still concluded that it would not help Lewis 
under its interpretation of Section 16(b). Since a shareholder of the 
issuer has standing to initiate a Section 16(b) action, Sears, as a 
shareholder of SDC, has standing to initiate a Section 16(b) action 
against Coldwell by initiating action against SDC, which is now by 
definition the inheritor of Coldwell's causes of action. Sears has this 
power, however, not Lewis. Lewis is only a shareholder of Sears. To 
have standing, he must have held shares of either Coldwell, the origi-
nal issuer, or of SDC, the statutory issuer after the merger. The court 
stated: "We will not confer standing on a plaintiff who falls outside 
the class of persons permitted by the language of the statute merely 
because the only parties falling within the class choose not to exercise 
their right to sue."112 
The ruling in Lewis recognizes that the purpose of the statute to 
allow Section 16(b) actions is fulfilled. The cause of action survives 
the merger, vesting in SDC. After the merger, SDC becomes the is-
suer. As the issuer, SDC has standing to initiate Section 16(b) action 
if it wants to. Even though Lewis is foreclosed, since the cause of 
action survives and since there is a class of persons with standing to 
sue, the Lewis court saw no need to stretch the language of the stat-
ute to an illogical limit. 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE Lewis DECISION 
The Blau court's interpretation is premised on the idea that it is 
necessary to interpret Section 16(b) broadly in order to fulfill con-
gressional intent. In interpreting Section 16(b) in an appeal from a 
district court decision, the Eighth Circuit found that a broad con-
struction is necessary to ensure that the cause of action survives./)3 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's reasoning that 
"since ... 16(b) was intended to protect property rights of the in-
vesting public as well as those of the issuing corporation, Section 
16(b) must he broadly construed in reaching the decision that the 
•• Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804. "That a merger may result in a corporation succeeding to an action 
formerly held by an individual is a consequence dictated by the statute." [d . 
•• [d. (citing Portnoy, 607 F.2d at 769) . 
•• . Western Auto Supply Co., 348 F.2d at 741-43. 
> 
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chose in action. . survived."114 It is true that if the cause of action 
were to be extinguished along with the issuer in a merger, the inabil-
ity of the issuer's shareholders on behalf of the corporation to fight 
insider speculation could result in injustice. Where a broad interpre-
tation is necessary to ensure that the cause of action survives, that 
interpretation is justifiable. 
On the other hand, a broad interpretation of Section 16(b) is not 
needed once it has been established that the cause of action survives 
and that a class exists of persons entitled to bring suit. The statute 
explicitly limits those with standing to issuers or holders of securities 
of the issuer. However, the Blau court's zeal to protect the public 
went too far by stretching the statute to include persons that Con-
gress never intended. The Blau court admitted that the statute 
doesn't explicitly allow conferring standing on holders of securities of 
a parent corporation, but it reasoned circularly that it doesn't actu-
ally forbid it either.1I11 Thus, Blau conferred standing on holders of 
securities of a parent corporation although they are expressly ex-
cluded from the statutory language. 
The Lewis court retreated from the broad interpretation of Blau, 
stating: "We have no constitutional authority to rewrite a statute 
simply because we may determine that it is susceptible of improve-
ment. "116 In refusing to confer standing on a shareholder of the parent 
of the successor in interest to the issuer, the Lewis court's relatively 
narrow reading stays closer to the legislative intent than Blau's ex-
pansive reading. 
Additionally, Lewis' determination of who has standing coincides 
more closely than Blau's with the public policy goal of reducing liti-
gation. An important goal of the Exchange Act was to "maximize the 
ability of the rule to eradicate speculative abuses by reducing difficul-
ties in proof ... to insure the optimum prophylactic effect."117 Con-
gress thought the "purpose and reach of the statute . . . would be 
clear, and litigation seldom necessary."118 Limiting the class of plain-
tiffs who can initiate Section 16(b) actions to the issuer or any hold-
ers of securities of the issuer reduces litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It may seem that where a successor corporation in a merger has no 
.. Id. at 739 . 
•• Blau, 250 F. Supp. at 886 . 
• 6 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804 (relying on Badaracco v. Comm'r, 464 U.S. 386 (1984)). 
'" Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970) . 
• s Newmark, 425 F.2d at 351; Note, supra note 18. 
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shareholders, if the successor corporation refuses to initiate Section 
16(b) action and there has been wrongdoing of the type the statute 
was designed to prevent, then the parent corporation and its share-
holders could be hurt and would have no redress. 59 This is unlikely to 
be the whole picture, however. The parent corporation can presuma-
bly find someone among the holders of the security of the original 
issuer to file suit if it so desires. Far more likely is the situation in 
both Blau and Lewis, where the successor corporation did not want 
to bring suit because such a suit would be counterproductive in terms 
of the finances and good will involved in the mergers. Congress cer-
tainly knew that corporations make use of wholly owned subsidiaries 
in mergers. The Lewis court emphasized that "[h]ad Congress 
wanted to discourage this practice by conferring standing on share-
holders of a parent corporation . . . it knew how to do so. "60 
As the Seventh Circuit court points out, if Congress were worried 
about such situations, it could rectify them with a "simple amend-
ment to the [Exchange] Act."61 By interpreting the statute as liter-
ally as possible, the Lewis court reaches a fair result without resort-
ing to drafting "judicial legislation. "62 
•• See Lewis, 762 F.2d at 803. 
6. [d. at 804. 
DEBORAH M. MOSTAGHEL 
6. Portnoy, 607 F.2d at 768 (quoting Lee National Corp. v. Segur, 281 F. Supp. 851, 852 (KD. 
Pa. 1968». 
6. [d. 
